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Abstract 
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions derived by 
Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) about the effects of the interaction between technology 
adoption and incomplete enforcement. They show that under Tradable Emissions Permits 
(TEPs), and in contrast to taxes, the fall in permit price produced by adoption of 
environmentally friendly technologies reduces the benefits of violating the environmental 
regulation at the margin and leads firms to improve their compliance behavior. Moreover, 
when TEPs are used, the regulator can speed up the diffusion of new technologies since the 
benefits from adopting the new technology increase with the enforcement stringency. 
Our experimental results confirm these theoretical predictions. While the aggregate 
emissions do not statistically differ between the two policy instruments, the fraction of firms 
violating the regulation and the aggregate extent of violation are lower under TEPs than under 
emission taxes regardless of the monitoring probability. Hence, in contrast to previous studies, 
our results indicate that TEPs would appear to be a feasible policy alternative in weak 
regulatory contexts. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, many donors and advisors have promoted the use of market-
based instrument (MBIs) as the key to more effective environmental protection in the 
developing world. Yet, the use remains sporadic in these countries. On the one hand, 
those arguing in favor of market-based instruments emphasize that they are efficient 
instruments that relax the trade-off between economic growth and improved 
environmental quality. Besides, they can be implemented without specific knowledge of 
the technology of or pollution-reduction costs for polluting sources. On the other hand, 
those opposed to their use emphasize monitoring and enforcement considerations since 
institutional and economic factors in developing countries limit regulators’ ability to 
monitor and enforce environmental regulations and hence impede the effectiveness of 
economic instruments (see Blackman and Harrington 2001, Bell and Rusell 2002, and 
Coria and Sterner 2010).
1
 
The latter seems difficult to rectify at least in the medium term, and it seems to be 
particularly pervasive in the case of TEPs since, unlike emission taxes, firms are linked 
together through the functioning of the permit market. Weak monitoring and enforcement 
does not only have a negative direct effect on compliance, there is also an indirect effect 
that occurs because changes in enforcement strategy can induce changes in permit prices 
(Malik 1990 and 1992, Stranlund and Dhanda1999, Stranlund and Chavez 2000, and 
Murphy and Stranlund 2006). 
Against this background, Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) compare emission 
taxes and tradable permits when both monitoring is not strong enough to guarantee 
perfect compliance and firms can adopt new and more efficient technologies to reduce 
the costs of compliance with environmental regulations.
2
 They show that under TEPs – 
                                                 
1
Environmental policies introduce important dilemmas of equity and justice as alternative policies imply a 
different distribution of costs among firms. Though these are very relevant in the context of a developing 
country, its analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2
 Monitoring is defined as the process of verifying firms’ status of compliance, and enforcement as the 
actions undertaken to bring firms to compliance. In developing countries, monitoring seems to dominate 
and better explain environmental performance (Dasgupta et al. 2001), which might be explained by the fact 
that regulators interact with firms in more than one context of domain and over many periods.  
4 
 
 
for a given monitoring probability and in contrast to taxes – technology adoption pushes 
the permit price down, which reduces the benefits of violating the environmental 
regulation and ultimately leads both adopters and non-adopters to modify their 
compliance behavior. Furthermore, regulators might speed up the adoption process 
through a more stringent enforcement under TEPs, while such an effect is absent in the 
case of taxes. Overall, this is good news for an enforcement regulator who can achieve a 
higher reduction in the extent of violation as well as a faster diffusion of new 
technologies through the use of TEPs.  
In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions by 
Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010). We use a 2x2 experimental design. The first 
dimension of variation is the policy instrument chosen to control pollution (uniform 
emissions taxes vs. auctioned tradable emissions permits). The second dimension is the 
stringency of monitoring probability. Our results indicate that fewer firms violate the 
regulation under TEPs than under emission taxes. Furthermore, the extent of the violation 
is lower under TEPs, while aggregate emissions and adoption rate do not differ 
statistically. Hence, as pointed out by Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010), compliance 
behavior is enhanced under TEPs, suggesting that for many developing countries, TEPs 
would appear to be a feasible policy alternative even though the regulatory contexts are 
weak. 
Several studies have used laboratory experiments to examine compliance behavior 
or technology adoption either under uniform taxes or TEPs (see, e.g., Gangadharan et al. 
2010, Cason and Gangadharan 2006, Murphy and Stranlund 2006, 2007, and Strandlund 
et al. 2011)
3
. However, none of the aforementioned studies analyze the interaction 
between incomplete enforcement and technology adoption, or its effects for the choice of 
policy instruments in developing countries where regulators have more difficulties 
                                                 
3
 Gangadharan et al. (2005) investigate whether emission markets encourage optimal investments. Cason 
and Gangadharan (2006) identify interactions between emission shocks, banking, compliance and 
enforcement in an emissions trading market in the presence of emissions uncertainty. Murphy and 
Stranlund (2006) study the direct and indirect effects of enforcement on compliance under TEPs. Murphy 
and Stranlund (2007) analyze the links between violations and increased enforcement stringency for 
heterogeneous firms. Finally, Stranlund et al. (2011) investigate enforcement and compliance when TEPs 
allow permit banking.   
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monitoring and sanctioning due to budget and technology constraints, and where the use 
of market-based mechanisms continues to grow in the policy debate.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 3 provides details about experimental design and procedures. Section 4 
presents the results and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Hypotheses 
We designed a series of laboratory experiments to test hypotheses about 
compliance behavior and technology adoption when firms are regulated either by uniform 
environmental taxes or by a system of auctioned TEPs. These hypotheses are derived 
from the theoretical model by Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010). In the following 
paragraphs, we briefly synthesize the model. For further details, we recommend the 
reader to review their paper.  
Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) consider a competitive industry consisting of a 
continuum of firms of mass 1 that are risk-neutral.
4
 They are also initially homogeneous 
in the abatement cost     , which is strictly convex and decreasing in emissions. In the 
absence of environmental regulation, each firm emits a quantity    of a homogeneous 
pollutant. There is an environmental authority that sets a maximum level of emissions 
and then chooses a policy instrument to reach this target. Since the regulator cannot 
observe firms’ emissions, costly monitoring is undertaken. The probability of being 
monitored is known by firms and equals π. Once the regulator monitors a firm, it is able 
to perfectly determine the firm’s compliance status. If the monitoring reveals that the firm 
is non-compliant, it faces the penalty    , which is a strictly convex function of the 
extent of violation    For zero violation, the penalty is zero      , yet the marginal 
penalty is greater than zero, i.e.,         
                                                 
4
Assuming, instead, that firms are risk averse would not change the results of this paper significantly since 
under a market-based regulation a firm’s choice of emissions is independent of its manager’s risk 
preference, its endowment of permits, and the enforcement strategy it faces (Stranlund 2008).Nevertheless, 
in the case of imperfect monitoring, the violation of a non-compliant firm will decrease if the manager’s 
utility function exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion. In such case, the demand for emission permits 
will increase and so will the equilibrium permit price and the rate of adoption. 
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A new and more efficient technology arrives and firms must decide whether or not 
to invest in it. The new technology allows firms to abate emissions at a lower cost given 
by      , where          is a parameter that represents the drop in abatement cost due 
to adoption of the new technology. They assume that buying and installing the new 
technology implies a fixed cost that differs among firms. Let    denote the fixed cost of 
adoption for firm  , where     is uniformly distributed on the interval      , with density 
function       and cumulative distribution function      . Let      and     be firm i’s 
total expected costs of abatement and compliance when using the current abatement 
technology (non-adoption) and new technology (adoption), respectively. The expected 
cost savings from adopting are            Any firm whose expected cost saving offset 
its adoption cost will adopt the new technology. Therefore, the adoption rate – denoted   
– depends on the total expected savings in the costs of abatement and compliance, which 
are endogenous to the choice of policy instrument, the stringency of the environmental 
policy, and the enforcement policy.  
The interaction between regulator and firms is as follows: 
1. The regulator makes a long-term commitment to a policy level and sets and 
announces her policy choice (either a unitary tax level or the number of emissions 
permits to be issued). She also chooses a uniform monitoring probability and a 
monetary sanction scheme, and announces it to the firms.
5
 
2. A new technology arrives, and firms have to decide whether to invest in it, their 
actual emission level, as well as reported emission level if regulated by uniform 
taxes or number of permits to buy and hold if regulated by TEPs. 
3. The regulator monitors the firms according to the announced monitoring 
probability and then sanctions those found in non-compliance according to the 
sanctioning scheme. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 If the regulator does not adjust the level of the policy in response to arrival of new technology, taxes 
provide stronger incentives for firms to adopt new technologies than do permits. Instead, if the regulator 
anticipates new technologies and adjusts the policy levels, taxes and permits are equivalent and they both 
will induce first-best outcomes if the regulator moves first (Requate and Unold 2003, Coria 2009). 
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Emissions and violation under taxes and TEPs 
In this setting, for the case of uniform taxes the problem of an adopter firm is the 
following
6
: 
 
(1)          
                                      
 
Solving this minimization problem, if the solution is interior, each firm chooses its 
emission levels such that the marginal abatement cost equals the tax rate. Since there is a 
uniform tax rate, in equilibrium firms’ marginal abatement costs are equal irrespective of 
their adoption status, i.e.,                . Therefore, adopters’ actual levels of 
emissions are reduced due to the availability of the new technology and are lower than 
those of non-adopters. In addition, since the tax is exogenous and not influenced by the 
enforcement strategy, firms’ actual emissions do not depend on the parameters of the 
enforcement problem. 
Firms choose to report a level of emissions such that the marginal benefit of non-
compliance (given by the tax) equals the marginal expected fine, i.e.,          . 
Since both the tax rate and the enforcement policy are the same for adopters and non-
adopters, it follows that the extent of violation is the same for both types of firms, i.e., 
             . Given that adopters’ emissions are lower than non-adopters’ 
emissions, it follows that the emissions reported by adopters are lower than those 
reported by non-adopters. Moreover, the report levels of adopter and non-adopter firms 
are decreasing in the tax rate and increasing in the monitoring probability (see Villegas 
and Coria 2010, page 280). 
 
Hypothesis 1:  With emission taxes, adopters of the new technology have lower 
emissions and report levels than non-adopters. Moreover, the emission level is 
                                                 
6
 The problem of the firms that do not adopt the new abatement technology is analogous to problem (2). 
The main difference is that the abatement costs for these kinds of firms are given by      instead of      . 
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independent of the monitoring probability but the report level is an increasing function of 
monitoring probability. 
Hypothesis 2: With emission taxes, the extent of violation is independent of the 
adoption status and is therefore the same for adopters and non-adopters of the new 
technology. The extent of violation is a decreasing function of the monitoring probability. 
 
A firm regulated by TEPs can abate a fraction of its emissions and buy permits to 
compensate for the remaining fraction. The equilibrium permit price is endogenous to the 
stringency of the monitoring and enforcement scheme and adoption rate. However, to 
simplify notation, we denote the equilibrium permit price   instead of        . 
Let   denote the quantity of permits held by a firm in equilibrium and    be the 
number of emissions permits, if any, initially allocated to it. Each permit gives the right 
to emit one unit of pollution. The problem of the firm in such case is as follows: 
 
(2)         
            [    ]                             
 
If the solution to this optimization problem is interior, in equilibrium each firm 
chooses its emissions such that the marginal abatement cost equals the equilibrium permit 
price, which is the same for all firms regardless of adoption status. Since adopters’ 
marginal abatement cost function is lower than that of non-adopters, adopters’ emission 
level is lower than that of non-adopters. 
In equilibrium, firms hold a quantity of permits such that the marginal benefit of 
non-compliance (given by the equilibrium permit price) equals the marginal expected 
fine, i.e.,             Since the permit price and the enforcement strategies faced by 
adopters and non-adopters are the same, we obtain that the difference between actual 
emissions level and number of permits held in equilibrium, i.e., the extent of violation, is 
the same for adopters and non-adopters. Therefore, with TEPs, the adopters’ actual 
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emissions and the quantity of permits that firms hold in equilibrium are lower than the 
actual emissions and the quantity of permits held by non-adopters in equilibrium. 
In contrast to taxes, though a firm's choice of emissions is not directly affected by 
the monitoring effort applied to it, it is indirectly affected through the effect of the 
monitoring probability on the equilibrium permit price. Intuitively, increased monitoring 
motivates firms to purchase more emissions permits to reduce the magnitude of their 
violations. This increased demand for permits then puts upward pressure on the 
equilibrium permit price, inducing firms to reduce their emissions to a larger extent 
(Stranlund and Dhanda 1999, page 274). 
Additionally, the adoption rate reduces the non-compliance incentives via the 
equilibrium permit price; adoption decreases adopters’ demand for permits and 
consequently the aggregate demand, which reduces the permit price and thus also the 
marginal benefit of non-compliance. Therefore, unlike taxes, technology adoption does 
provide incentives to improve compliance when firms are regulated by TEPs. This is an 
important difference between these two instruments, which relates to the fact that taxes 
are fixed by the regulator, while the equilibrium permit price varies with the enforcement 
strategy and the rate of technology adoption (Villegas-Palacio and Coria 2010, page 283). 
  
Hypothesis 3: With TEPs, adopters of the new technology have a lower emission 
level and hold a lower quantity of permits than non-adopters. Moreover, the emission 
level is a decreasing function and the permit holding an increasing function of the 
monitoring probability.  
Hypothesis 4: With TEPs, a firm’s extent of violation is independent of its adoption 
status and is therefore the same for adopters and non-adopters of the new technology. 
The extent of violation is a decreasing function of the monitoring probability. 
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Adoption rate 
As stated above, the rate of adoption is determined by the difference between the 
expected costs of abatement and compliance under the current and the new technology. 
For the case of uniform taxes, this difference is expressed as: 
 
(3)    
      
    [                   ]   [            ]  
 
Finally, from the definition of the uniform cumulative distribution of   , the 
adoption rate can be characterized as a fraction of the adoption cost savings    
      
   , 
as follows:   
 
(4)       {                     [            ]}     
 
where   
 
   
 and   
 
   
   
Note that since neither the emission level nor the tax rate is a function of 
monitoring probability or of the sanction structure, the enforcement strategy does not 
affect the rate of adoption.    
 
Hypothesis 5: When emission taxes are used, the adoption rate does not depend on 
the enforcement strategy but is determined only by the tax rate. 
 
As with the case of taxes, the rate of adoption under TEPs is determined by the 
difference between the expected costs of abatement and compliance under the current and 
the new technology; and it can be characterized as follows: 
 
(5)        {                     [                ]}   . 
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Note that since the permit price and adopters’ and non-adopters’ demand for 
permits are increasing functions of the monitoring probability, the rate of technology 
adoption depends on this parameter as well. 
 
Hypothesis 6: When TEPs are used, the adoption rate is an increasing function of 
the monitoring probability. 
 
Hypothesis 5 and 6 represent another important difference between taxes and TEPs. 
In contrast to taxes, the rate of technology adoption is an increasing function of 
monitoring probability when the regulation takes the form of TEPs. This result has 
interesting implications for the comparison of the adoption incentives provided by these 
two policy instruments. Since firms with higher costs of adoption can free ride on the 
decreased permit price caused by other firms’ adoption, the private gains from adopting 
the technology under permits are reduced and so is the rate of adoption. However, 
hypothesis 6 implies that by increasing the monitoring probability, the regulator can 
offset the permit price depreciation while encouraging firms to reduce the extent of 
violation. Therefore, under permits, a more stringent enforcement strategy may increase 
the rate of adoption of new technology while still providing firms with larger incentives 
to increase compliance than taxes. This is good news for the regulators since by choosing 
TEPs, the continuous development of cleaner technologies may imply a larger rate of 
compliance with environmental regulations (Villegas-Palacio and Coria 2010, page 285). 
 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
3.1 Experimental design 
Section II introduced six hypotheses regarding the relationship between imperfect 
enforcement and technology adoption. To test these hypotheses we conducted a series of 
laboratory experiments in a between-subjects 2x2 design with 4 treatments as shown in 
Table 1. The first dimension of variation is the policy instrument chosen to control 
pollution (uniform emissions taxes vs. auctioned tradable emissions permits). The second 
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dimension is the stringency of monitoring probability. Our experiments are framed in the 
context of a firm (represented by a subject) that is regulated by either environmental taxes 
or auctioned TEPs.
7
 
All treatments consisted of only one round. Each treatment had three experimental 
sessions with 18 subjects in each, all in all 211participants. Each subject represented a 
firm with an initial endowment of E=20,000 tokens, representing their profits before 
decisions were made.
8
 
 
Table 1: Experimental design 
Monitoring 
probability 
Regulatory policy instrument 
Uniform taxes Auctioned TEPs 
Low ( = 0.4) Treatment 1 Treatment 3 
High ( = 0.9) Treatment 2 Treatment 4 
 
 
In line with the model presented in the previous section, we assume that as a result 
of its production and before any abatement process, each firm has an initial level of 
emissions    of 10 units. The firm has a current abatement technology represented by the 
marginal abatement cost function    
           [    ]. A new and more efficient 
abatement technology is available and represented by the abatement cost function 
  
           [    ]. Each subject was randomly assigned a fixed cost of adoption 
ranging uniformly in the range [10, 2500]. A firm that is regulated by uniform taxes, i.e., 
treatments 1 and 2, has to make the following decisions:  
                                                 
7
There is no consensus on whether experiments should be framed in a particular context to avoid this 
influencing the results (see Murphy and Cárdenas 2004). However, we frame our experiment in the context 
of compliance to environmental regulations since we want to capture the effect of intrinsic motivations to 
comply with regulations and to adopt new technologies, which could potentially be affected by attitudes 
with respect to the environment. We do not consider this a problem given our between subjects design and 
that participants were randomly assigned to each treatment.   
8
 Each token was converted into 1.5 Colombian pesos (COP).   
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(1) The adoption decision: whether the firm will operate with the current abatement 
technology or buy and install a new and more efficient abatement technology.  
(2) The actual emissions decision: how many units of the initial emission level it 
will abate, which determines the actual emission level  . 
(3) The reported emissions decision: how many units of the actual emission level 
the firm will self-report to the authority. The unitary tax is 500 tokens. Note that there are 
no benefits of reporting more emissions than the actual level, since then the firm would 
have to pay the tax per unit of excess emissions. Instead, the firm might want to 
underreport in order to reduce the tax payment. Hence,    [   ]  
At the end of the round, the authority conducted an auditory procedure with a 
known monitoring probability to verify that the reported emission level coincided with 
the actual emission level. Since the monitoring probability is one of our treatment 
variables, it varies across treatment, as described in Table 1. In the first treatment, only 7 
out of 18 participants were monitored (i.e., 40% of the subjects). In the second treatment, 
90% of the participants were monitored. The difference between the two monitoring 
probabilities should reflect the stringency of the enforcement schemes observed in 
developing and developed countries. While direct and continuous monitoring of 
emissions has been an important factor in the success of environmental programs in 
developed countries (Stranlund et al. 2002), the enforcement design used in less 
developed countries has not induced a high level of compliance (Coria and Sterner 2010). 
When caught in violation, the firm was sanctioned according to a penalty schedule 
given by              The convexity of this penalty schedule, together with the 
convexity of the abatement cost function, guarantees that the second order conditions of 
the minimization problems in equations (1) and (2) are satisfied. 
As with taxes, a firm regulated by TEPs, i.e., treatments 3 and 4, has to make (1) 
the adoption decision and (2) the actual emissions decision. However, instead of 
reporting emissions, the firm must decide (3) how many permits to buy to compensate its 
emissions. The unitary permit price is endogenously determined by the number of firms 
that adopt the new technology. As with uniform taxes, the number of permits that the 
firm buys should be in the interval [   ]  As in the first two treatments, at the end of the 
round the authority conducted an auditory procedure with a known monitoring 
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probability to verify that the reported emission level coincided with the number of 
permits held by the firm in equilibrium. The monitoring probability and the penalty 
schedule are as in treatments 1 and 2.  
 
3.2 Experimental procedure 
Participants were recruited at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia from the 
business management and administration engineering undergraduate programs. This 
allows us to derive conclusions from a group of people that are representative of the 
future managers and engineers in polluting industries or in regulatory agencies in the 
public sector, and that are not too far from making these kinds of decisions in reality. 
Subjects were paid an initial COP 5,000 show-up fee (about USD 2.7) for participating in 
the experiment and showing up on time. Their additional earnings from their decisions 
ranged from COP 11,000 to COP 30,000 with an average of COP 23,800 (USD 12.87) 
and a standard deviation of around COP 3,800. At the time, the daily minimum wage in 
the country was around USD 9.9. 
The experiment was run in a computer lab with each terminal providing an Excel 
worksheet specially designed to allow the subjects to perform calculations of additional 
earnings for all possible combinations of adoption decisions, actual emission level and 
reported emissions (in the case of taxes)/demand for permits (in the case of TEPs). Each 
session lasted around 90 minutes. At the beginning of the session, each participant was 
randomly assigned an identification number that determined her fixed adoption cost. 
They were also handed the instructions, which were read aloud by the experimenter. The 
instructions for treatments 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix A. To make the participants 
familiar with the experimental protocol, a set of control questions was included in the 
instructions. In order to answer the control questions, the participants needed to operate 
the same Excel worksheet that was used in the experiment but with a different set of 
parameters. The answers to the control questions were not considered in the analysis.
9
 
After all the participants had completed the training and all questions had been answered, 
the experiment began. 
                                                 
9
 All of our participants answered the control questions correctly, indicating a good understanding of the 
instructions and Excel worksheet. 
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All participants had 20 minutes to make their decisions. Once all participants had 
made their decisions, the completed experimental cards were collected by the 
experimenter and the monitoring stage followed. To select the firms that were going to be 
monitored, the experimenter had cards with all the participants’ numbers in a bag. In 
front of the participants, the experimenter randomly selected and read aloud the numbers 
of the participants to be monitored. 
 After the monitoring stage had been completed, the final questionnaire was handed 
out to the participants. Given that our experimental design included a stochastic 
regulatory process, the first part of the questionnaire aimed at measuring risk preferences. 
To this end we had an incentivized risk experiment adapted from the risk experiment by 
Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects were faced with a menu of 10 paired lottery choices; in 
each case they had to choose between two lotteries, A and B. The payment for lottery A 
was constant, riskless and equal to USD 2.7710; lottery B was risky, but offered twice as 
much as lottery A. In the first paired lottery, the probability of the high payoff under 
lottery B was 9/10. In the second, it was equal to 8/10, and it decreased systematically 
though the sequence of paired lotteries. When the probability of the high payoff outcome 
decreases to a certain point, a person should cross over to lottery A. Hence, the crossover 
point from the risky to the riskless lottery can be used to infer the degree of risk aversion. 
Clearly, the lower the probability of the high payoff at which subjects switch to lottery A, 
the lower the risk aversion since subjects demand a lower expected compensation in 
order to turn down to the risky alternative. 
Subjects were told from the beginning that at the moment of payment one of the 
choice sets was going to be randomly selected for the payment using a dice such that all 
choice sets had the same probability of being chosen. If the participant had chosen 
alternative B in the selected choice, a second dice was used to play the lottery according 
to the indicated probabilities. 
Once all participants had handed in the final questionnaire, subjects were privately 
paid (in cash) the show-up fee, the earnings from the experiment, and the earnings from 
the risk experiment.  
                                                 
10
Exchange rate 1,800 COP per USD. 
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4. Results 
First, we will present some descriptive statistics of the socio-economic 
characteristics of our participants and non-parametric tests of our hypotheses. We will 
then analyze the influence of some behavioral variables.  
 
 
4.1.  Descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests of hypotheses 
Table 2 presents the average and standard deviation of some demographic 
characteristics, i.e., gender, age, monthly expenses (as a proxy for income), and risk 
attitudes, of the participants in each treatment. For the variable risk attitudes we use the 
results of the incentivized risk experiment described in the previous section. Based on the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that gender, monthly 
expenses, risk attitudes, and age composition are equal between the comparable 
treatments (i.e., T1 vs. T2, T1 vs. T3, T2 vs. T4, and T3 vs. T4).   
 
Table 2: Socio-demographic characteristics 
 
 
Treatment T1 T2 T3 T4 
N 54 52 53 53 
Gender (% males) 
0.57 
(0.5) 
0.6 
(0.5) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
Age 
21.77 
(2.51) 
21.19 
(2.33) 
21.45 
(2.94) 
21.01 
(2.23) 
Monthly expenses (US $) 
214.36 
(81.78) 
179.78 
(50.12) 
207.02 
(103.59) 
202.82 
(70.31) 
Risk attitudes 
54.62 
(15.50) 
55.96 
(15.50) 
53.08 
(14.89) 
57.92 
(17.14) 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the actual and reported emission levels 
and of violation for adopters and non-adopters in all treatments (Appendix B presents the 
level predicted by the theoretical model for each of these variables given our set of 
parameters).  
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Table 3: Summary statistics for actual/reported emissions and violation. 
 
 Actual emissions  Reported emissions  Firms violating (%) Violation 
 Adopters 
Non- 
adopters 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
Emission taxes 
Treatment 1 
6.25 
(1.52) 
8.2 
(1.18) 
3.83 
(1.9) 
4.47 
(1.54) 
71.43 94.74 
2.43 
(2.2) 
3.73 
(1.66) 
Treatment 2 
6.30 
(1.04) 
8.35 
(1.23) 
5.07 
(1.72) 
6.31 
(2.59) 
53.85 73.08 
1.23 
(1.39) 
2,03 
(2.41) 
Auctioned TEPs 
Treatment 3 
6.18 
(1.41) 
8.77 
(1.28) 
5.44 
(1.65) 
6.23 
(3.05) 
40.74 61.54 
0.81 
(1.11) 
2.53 
(2.9) 
Treatment 4 
6.18 
(1.75) 
7.85 
(2.33) 
6.22 
(1.62) 
7.7 
(1.93) 
12.5 19.05 
0.15 
(0.45) 
0.38 
(0.97) 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
 
As expected, we observe that adopters emit less than non-adopters in all treatments. 
They also report less than non-adopters. With respect to the extent of violation, we 
observe that as theory predicts, the higher the monitoring probability, the lower the 
fraction of firms violating the regulation and the lower the average violation.   
In the case of taxes, the results support Hypothesis 1 as adopters have significantly 
lower emissions and report less than do non-adopters of the new technology. However, 
Hypothesis 2 only holds when the monitoring probability is high (see Appendix C for 
Mann-Whitney statistical tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2). If the monitoring probability is 
low (treatment 1), adopters violate significantly less than non-adopters. This result 
indicates that there could be some behavioral characteristics of adopters related to 
decision making under risk and uncertainty (not captured by the theoretical model) that 
also affect the compliance decision and that become relatively more relevant when the 
enforcement is less stringent. We explore this issue in the econometric analysis in Section 
4.3.   
In contrast to the case of uniform taxes, the theoretical prediction for TEPs is that 
firms’ actual emission levels decrease with the monitoring probability since the permit 
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price increases. However, we do not find evidence to support such a hypothesis as 
adopters’ and non-adopters’ emission levels are not statistically affected by the 
probability of being monitored. Nevertheless, as expected, we observe that adopters emit 
significantly less than non-adopters in both treatments, yet hold significantly fewer 
permits than non-adopters only for high monitoring probabilities. 
The hypothesis that under TEPs the extent of violation drops when the monitoring 
probability increases is also confirmed (see Appendix D for Mann-Whitney statistical 
tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4). Similarly, we find that when the monitoring probability is 
high, adopters and non-adopters violate to the same extent.  
Finally, Figure 1 presents the expected and actual adoption rates in all the 
treatments. Actual adoption rates are significantly higher than expected across the board. 
As stated above, this might be due to behavioral variables, in addition to the variables in 
the theoretical model, increasing the willingness to invest in environmentally friendly 
technologies. On the other hand, we observe that for both policy instruments, the 
adoption rate is not affected by monitoring probability. Thus, we cannot reject 
Hypothesis 5 (p value = 0.13). However, we can reject Hypothesis 6 since under TEPs 
the rate of adoption when the monitoring probability is low is statistically equivalent to 
the rate of adoption when the monitoring probability is high (p-value = 0.33). 
 
Figure 1: Observed and expected adoption rates 
 
 
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7
Tax Low Monitoring Probability (T1)
Tax High Monitoring Probability (T2)
TEPs Low Monitoring Probability (T3)
TEPs High Monitoring Probability (T4)
Predicted Adoption Rate Actual Adoption Rate
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4.2 Non-parametric tests comparing taxes and TEPs  
 
Table 4 reports the p-values of the Mann-Whitney statistical test to verify whether 
there are statistically significant differences in the levels of actual emissions, percentage 
of firms in violation, and the extent of violation between the comparable treatments 
involving taxes and TEPs (i.e., T1 vs. T3 and T2 vs. T4). As the rate of adoption differs 
between treatments, we also report the weighted average of the variables under study. 
 Note that there are no statistically significant differences in the adopters’ and 
weighted average levels of emissions under taxes and TEPs. However, non-adopters emit 
less under emission taxes when the monitoring probability is low. Under TEPs though, 
fewer adopters and non-adopters violate the regulation, and the extent of their violation is 
significantly lower than under taxes. This holds regardless of monitoring probability. 
 
Table 4: Non-parametric test comparing emissions and violation under 
emission taxes and TEPs 
 
 Actual emissions  Firms violating (%) Extent of violation 
 Adopters 
Non 
adopters 
Weighted 
average 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
Weighted 
average 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
Weighted 
average 
T1-T3 0.694 0.084
*
 0.149 0.016*** 0.01*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.043** 0.001*** 
T2-T4 0.955 0.930 0.393 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(***) 
statistically significant at 1%. 
(**) 
statistically significant at 5%, 
(*)
 statistically significant at 10%. 
 
 
Why do firms, for a given monitoring probability, violate less under TEPs while 
still emitting the same? This result seems to be driven by the effect of technology 
adoption on the permit price. Even though for a given monitoring probability there are no 
statistical differences between the adoption rate induced by uniform taxes and TEPs (p-
values 0.148 and 0.287 for T1-T3 and T2-T4 respectively), the final emission prices, and 
therefore the marginal benefits of non-compliance, are rather different. Indeed, Figure 2 
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presents the actual and expected permit prices for treatments 3 and 4. As theory predicts, 
the permit price is increasing with monitoring probability (p-value =0.000), and it is 
lower than the emission tax. Actual permit prices are much lower than expected due to 
the large fraction of firms adopting the technology and hence demanding fewer permits, 
pushing the permit price down.  
Furthermore, even though the rate of adoption under TEPs does not statistically 
differ between T3-T4, the fraction of firms violating and the violation extent do decrease 
in monitoring probability under TEPs. Hence, our results show that in contrast to taxes, 
the deterrent effect of the monitoring effort under TEPs is reinforced by the effect of the 
technology adoption rate on the extent of violations. 
 
Figure 2: Actual / expected prices under different treatments 
 
 
 
Finally, although the analysis of the fiscal uses of the tax revenues or proceeds from 
selling permits is beyond the scope of our paper, it is straightforward to say that 
governmental revenues would be lower under TEPs due to the lower price per unit of 
emissions. 
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4.3   Influence of behavioral variables on our results – some regressions 
Here we explore the effects of some socio-demographic and attitudinal variables on 
actual emissions and reporting and on the adoption decision. 
Table 5 presents the results of a probit model for the probability of adopting the 
new technology. The explanatory variables are monitoring probability, risk attitudes, 
gender (as a dummy variable that takes the value one for males and zero otherwise), the 
interaction between risk and gender, and the fixed cost of adoption (randomly assigned to 
each participant at the beginning of the experiment). We also included a “pro-technology 
index” that indicates the degree (on a scale from 1 to 10) to which participants agreed 
with the following statements: “Science and technology are making our lives healthier, 
easier, and more comfortable” and “Thanks to science and technology the next 
generations will have more opportunities.” The pro-technology index is the average of 
the participants’ answers to these two statements. The higher the value of the index, the 
more pro-technology the participant is.   
 
 
Table 5: Probit model of adoption. 
 
Probability of adopting the new 
technology (marginal effects) 
 
Uniform taxes 
 
Auctioned TEPs 
 
Monitoring probability 
-0.364 
(0.093) 
0.178 
(0.382) 
Risk  
-0.015*
 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Gender  
-0.313 
(0.404) 
0.614* 
(0.265) 
Fixed adoption cost 
(in thousand tokens) 
-0.414*** 
(0.083) 
-0.062 
(0.284) 
Pro-technology index 
-0.008 
(-0.027) 
-0.032 
(-0.029) 
Risk*Gender 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.015* 
(0.007) 
N 106 104 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  
(***) 
statistically significant at 1%. 
(**) 
statistically significant at 5%, 
(*)
 statistically significant at 10%. 
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The results suggest that under uniform taxes, the higher the risk aversion the lower 
the probability of a firm adopting the new technology. However, this variable does not 
have a significant effect on the probability of adopting a new technology under TEPs. 
Analogously, those who have a higher fixed cost of adoption have a lower probability of 
adopting the new technology under uniform taxes while its effect is not statistically 
significant under TEPs. Under TEPs, however, gender influences the probability of 
adopting a new technology as males are more prone to adopt it than females. In addition, 
under TEPs, the more risk-averse males are less likely to adopt the new technology as 
indicated by the negative interaction between risk aversion and gender. 
Table 6 presents the results of a Tobit model for the actual emission levels under 
uniform taxes and TEPs. As explanatory variables we included adoption status and the 
responses to a series of attitudinal questions. For instance, we asked subjects how well 
they were represented by the statement, “For this person, it is very important to take care 
of nature and the environment.” The participant selected a value from 1 to 6, where the 
lower the value the stronger the identification with the statement. This last variable is 
denoted Importance of environment. We also asked the participants if they knew about 
the existence of environmental regulations in Colombia, which we include in the model 
as a dummy variable.   
 
Table 6: Tobit model of actual emission levels. 
 
Dependent variable: Actual emissions level  
Emission  taxes 
 
Auctioned TEPs 
 
Adoption 
 
-2.090*** 
(0.265) 
-2.312*** 
(0.369) 
Knowledge of environmental regulations 
0.337 
(0.345) 
3.22*** 
(0.975) 
Importance of environment  
 
0.319* 
(0.147) 
0.34* 
(0.18) 
Monthly expenses (UD $) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
Constant 7.871*** 7.67*** 
 (0.53) (0.67) 
N 105 103 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  
(***) 
statistically significant at 1%. 
(**) 
statistically significant at 5%, 
(*)
 statistically significant at 10%. 
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Our results show that adopters emit less than non-adopters under both policy 
instruments. Participants who feel strongly that it is important to take care of the 
environment emit statistically less under both policy instruments. Furthermore, the 
individuals who claimed to know about the existence of environmental regulations emit 
more under TEPs than those who did not have such knowledge. This is an indication of 
the role that intrinsic motivation and knowledge can play for pro-environmental behavior.   
Finally, Table 7 reports the results of both a Probit and a Tobit model for the 
probability of being in non-compliance and for the extent of violation, respectively.  We 
included variables such as treatment (as an indication of monitoring probability), 
adoption status, and some attitudinal variables, e.g., how guilty they would feel if they 
would violate the regulation (on a scale from 1 to 5, where the larger the value the lower 
the guilt), the degree of agreement with the statement, “Environmental regulations should 
never be violated” (where the larger the value the stronger the agreement), and how well 
subjects were represented by the statement, “For this person it is very important to always 
to do the correct thing” (on a scale from 1 to 6, where the lower the value the stronger the 
identification with the statement). 
Our results suggest that under uniform taxes and TEPs, technology adoption and a 
higher monitoring probability reduce the probability of being in non-compliance.  In the 
case of taxes, those who feel strongly that it is important to take care of the environment 
are less likely to be in violation, whereas this variable does not have a significant effect in 
the case of TEPs.  However, those who agree with the statement that it is important to 
always do the correct thing are less likely to violate under TEPs, whereas this variable 
does not have a significant effect under taxes. Again, these results indicate that intrinsic 
motivations may affect the decision to comply with a regulation. Intrinsic motivation and 
the monitoring probability also affect the size of violation. For the case of taxes, the 
extent of the violation of those who agree that environmental regulations should not be 
violated is lower; in the case of TEPs those who think that it is important to always do 
what is correct violate to a lower extent.  
 
 
 
24 
 
 
Table 7: Probit and Tobit model for probability and extent of violation 
 
 Emission taxes Auctioned TEPs 
 
Probit 
model 
 
Tobit 
model 
Tobit 
model 
for v>0 
Probit 
model 
 
Tobit 
model 
Tobit 
model 
for v>0 
Treatment 
 
-0.25** 
(0.096) 
 
-2.16*** 
(0.528) 
-1.33** 
(0.437) 
-0.44*** 
(0.10) 
 
-4.26*** 
(0.918) 
-2.137* 
(0.81) 
Adoption 
 
-0.19* 
(0.089) 
 
-1.23* 
(0.516) 
-0.455 
(0.414) 
-0.316** 
(0.11) 
-3.464*** 
(0.878) 
-2.44** 
(0.67) 
Guilt 
 
-0.032 
(0.056) 
 
-0.249 
(0.321) 
-0.106 
(0.279) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.967* 
(0.46) 
0.05 
(0.40) 
Environmental regulations 
should never be violated 
 
-0.068 
(0.08) 
 
-0.743* 
(0.402) 
-0.523* 
(0.314) 
-0.02 
(0.717) 
-0.198 
(0.723) 
0.227 
(0.50) 
It is important to always do 
the correct thing 
 
-0.015 
(0.040) 
-0.09 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(0.21) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
1.199** 
(0.41) 
 
0.943* 
(0.403) 
Importance of the 
environment 
 
0.132* 
(0.04) 
0.656* 
(0.338) 
0.159 
(0.273) 
0.015 
0.792 
0.010 
(0.982) 
-0.05 
(0.88) 
Monthly expenses  
-0.0006* 
(0.00) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.0006 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
Knowledge of 
environmental regulations 
 
0.122 
(0.099) 
0.514 
(0.674) 
-0.08 
(0.88) 
   
Constant 
 10.26*** 
(2.519) 
8.27*** 
(2.11) 
 20.74** 
(6.27) 
14.36** 
(5.055) 
N 103 103 74 98 104 35 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
(***) 
statistically significant at 1%. 
(**) 
statistically significant at 5%, 
(*)
 statistically significant at 10%. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Over the years, environmental economists have argued for the use of economic 
policy instruments for pollution control. Emission taxes and tradable emissions permits 
have been extensively compared and ranked under several criteria. In a recent theoretical 
paper, Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) study the interaction between incomplete 
enforcement and technology adoption when firms are regulated under uniform emission 
taxes and auctioned tradable emissions permits. The present paper constitutes an 
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empirical test of the theoretical predictions derived in their study. Our experimental 
results confirm most of the theoretical predictions related to actual emission levels, 
reported emission levels, and number of permits held by firms. Nevertheless, the 
observed adoption rate is significantly higher than predicted. In contrast to theory, which 
predicts that the adoption rate is higher under taxes than under TEPs, we find that it is not 
significantly different between the two policy instruments. At aggregate level, our results 
suggest that aggregate emissions do not differ significantly between the two policy 
instruments either. However, the fraction of firms violating the regulation and the 
aggregate extent of violation are lower under TEPs than under uniform taxes regardless 
of monitoring probability.   
Overall, our results provide support for the use of TEPs. One should also remember 
that emission taxes imply a need for monitoring and institutions. From our results it is not 
clear that trading schemes require a more “stringent enforcement” in order to fulfill the 
same environmental target in the presence of imperfect compliance. Furthermore, the fact 
that emission prices are endogenous to technological progress and the enforcement 
strategy allows for an adjustment in the equilibrium permit price needed to induce further 
compliance and enhance economic efficiency. This effect is absent in the case of 
emission taxes. 
Choosing the adequate policy instrument to regulate pollution requires a strict 
analysis from the theoretical but also from the empirical point of view. The opportunities 
for such an analysis in a controlled environment are rather scarce.  Economic experiments 
offer useful tools for understanding the performance of different policy instruments under 
different conditions. This paper uses such a technique for testing theoretical predictions 
and comparing uniform taxes and TEPs in the context of imperfect monitoring and 
technology adoption. A natural further step in this line of research is to replicate these 
results within actual firms that regularly face a regulatory environment and have to make 
decisions about pollution and abatement technologies. The growth of field experiments 
with firms confirms that such a path should offer additional insights (Bandeira et al. 
2011). We have here offered a new experimental design that could be taken to the field – 
either by using experimental subjects as representative of firms or by conducting the 
experiments within firms with different types of decision makers – to explore the 
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effectiveness of these different regulatory mechanisms in contexts where monitoring and 
enforcement by the regulator are determinant, as in the case of many developing 
countries. 
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Appendix A:  INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment that tries to recreate a situation in which a 
group of firms are regulated by an environmental policy and must make some decisions 
that we will explain later.  
 
You represent a firm that will have the opportunity to earn some profits in an 
experimental currency called tokens (E$).  The quantity of tokens that your firm will earn 
depends on your decisions. At the end of the session each token will be converted to 
Colombian pesos and you will be paid in cash the quantity you earned with your 
decisions.  For each token you earn you will receive 1.5 Colombian pesos.  
 
Different participants will earn different amounts. It is important that you do not talk or 
communicate with other participants during this experiment.  If you do not follow these 
rules we will have to ask you to leave the experiment.  
 
We will start by giving you a complete description of the experiment.  If you have any 
questions while we read the instructions please raise your hand.  If you have any 
hesitation after we start the experiment, please raise your hand and a monitor will be with 
you to help.  
 
ALL YOUR DECISIONS WILL BE COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS 
 
In this experiment you represent a firm that as a consequence of its production process 
emits a fixed quantity of pollution to the atmosphere; this quantity will be called 
INITIAL EMISSIONS. Nobody in the experiment, except you, knows your initial 
emissions. Your firm is regulated by an environmental policy that dictates that for each 
unit of pollutant that is emitted to the atmosphere you should pay a fixed quantity of 
money to the authority as a tax.  
To pay such taxes you should self-report to the authority the quantity of pollutant you are 
emitting. Your firm can reduce the quantity of money to pay to the authority through two 
channels:  reducing the initial emissions with the use of pollution control technologies 
and/or under-reporting to the authority the quantity of pollution you are emitting.  The 
final quantity of pollution you emit after you have controlled part of it by using 
technologies is called REAL EMISSIONS. The quantity of pollutant you self-report to 
the authority is called REPORTED EMISSIONS. 
 
With the aim of verifying that the reported emissions coincide with the real emissions, 
the authority must visit the firms. But given that the authority has limited resources only 
some firms will be visited. You will know how many firms the authority will visit but 
you will not know if your firm will be visited or not. If your firm tries to evade taxes – 
that is, if the reported emissions are lower than the real emissions – your firm will be 
sanctioned and you will have to pay a fine.   
29 
 
 
 
The costs of reducing the initial emissions (called costs of emissions control or abatement 
costs) depend on the quantity of emissions that your firm decides to reduce and the 
abatement technology it has. Actually, your firm has an abatement technology that we 
will call “actual technology” and that you can use to reduce your initial emissions.  
However, you can buy and install a new abatement technology that is more efficient and 
that will reduce the abatement costs further.  
During the experiment you will have information about: 
 Abatement costs using the actual technology. 
 Abatement costs using the new technology. 
 Costs of buying and installing the new technology. This will be called investment 
costs.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive a quantity of tokens as an initial 
endowment. During the experiment you will have to make decisions about:  
 Whether to buy and install the new technology. 
 How many units of your initial emissions to reduce. 
 How many units of your real emissions to report, that is, your reported emissions. 
What you decide determines your earnings, which will be calculated as follows: 
Your initial endowment minus: 
- Investment costs (only if your firm decides to buy and install the new technology) 
- Tax payments (based on your reported emissions) 
- Sanctions (only if you evade taxes and are visited by the authority) 
 
= Total earnings 
 
 
 
Now we will explain how we will conduct the experiment.  All the numbers that you will 
see now are only examples and do not necessarily coincide with the numbers that you 
will work with during the experiment.   
 
During the experiment you will use an Excel worksheet.  In that worksheet you will have 
the information about your initial endowment, your investment costs, your initial 
emissions, and the number of firms that will be visited by the authority. Additionally, 
using the worksheet you will be able to see how much your earnings would be for 
different decisions. The worksheet looks as follows. You will be able to write your 
decisions in the yellow cells.  
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THANKS FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXPERIMENT 
 
Initial endowment in tokens 
  
Out of the 18 firms participating in this experiment, the number of firms to be 
visited by the authority is:   
     
The costs of buying and installing the abatement technology range 
between 30 tokens and 250 tokens. 
  
 
Initial emissions 
  
Costs of buying and installing the new abatement technology (investment costs) 
for your firm:    
    
  
      
 
Please write your firm number (your 
identification number in the experiment) 
    
These are the detailed costs (in tokens) in which you will incur with your 
decisions   
   
    
 
If you buy and install the 
new technology 
If you use the 
actual technology   
 
DECISIONS   Investment costs     
  
 
Reduced emissions     Abatement costs     
  
 
That means that your real emissions are     Tax payment     
  
 
How many of these real emissions are you 
going to report (reported emissions)?  
    
Sanction if you are visited by 
the authority and found under-
reporting emissions 
    
  
    
  
      
 
EARNINGS 
   
 
  
 
If you buy and install the new 
technology 
If you use the actual technology   
   
 
  
 
In tokens In Colombian Pesos In tokens In Colombian Pesos   
   
 
  
Your earnings if you ARE NOT VISITED by the 
authority 
          
   
 
  Your earnings if you ARE VISITED by the authority           
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As an example we will assume the following: 
 Initial endowment: 800 tokens 
 Initial emissions: 15 units 
 Investment costs:  100 tokens 
 Out of the 18 firms participating in this experiment, the number of firms to be 
monitored is 7 
 Assume you reduce 4 units of emissions.  That implies that your real emissions are 11 
units (15-4=11) 
 If you use the actual technology your abatement costs are 48 tokens 
 If you use the new technology your abatement costs are 34 tokens 
 Out of the 11 units of pollution you report 2 units to the authority 
 
Let’s consider different situations to see your earnings with different decisions:  
 
A. If your firm adopts the new technology and is not visited by the authority, your 
earnings are: 
800 tokens (initial endowment) - 100 tokens (investment costs) – 34 tokens (abatement costs) 
– 100 tokens (tax payment) = 566 tokens 
 
B. If your firm adopts the new technology and is visited by the authority, your earnings 
are: 
800 tokens (initial endowment) - 100 tokens (investment costs) – 34 tokens (abatement costs) 
– 100 tokens (tax payment) – 406 tokens (fine) = 161 tokens 
 
C. If your firm uses the actual technology and is not visited by the authority, your 
earnings are: 
800 tokens (initial endowment) – 48 tokens (abatement costs) – 100 tokens (tax payment) = 
652 tokens 
 
D. If your firm uses the actual technology and is visited by the authority, your earnings 
are: 
800 tokens (initial endowment) – 48 tokens (abatement costs) – 100 tokens (tax payment) -
406 tokens (fine)= 246 tokens 
 
You will not need to make these calculations; you only need to write your decisions about 
reduced emissions and reported emissions in the yellow cells, and the Excel worksheet will 
calculate for you.  You can see the results in the same worksheet as follows:  
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EARNINGS 
  
 
If you buy and install the new 
technology 
If you use the actual technology 
  
  
 
In tokens 
In Colombian 
Pesos 
In tokens In Colombian Pesos 
  
  
Your earnings if you ARE NOT 
VISITED by the authority 566 22 656 652 26 080   
  
Your earnings if you ARE 
VISITED by the authority 161 6 420 246 9 844   
              
 
In this example you will earn more money when your firm uses the actual technology 
and is not monitored by the authority. However, this is not always the case and depends 
on the specific number you get in the experiment. 
Please remember that all the numbers in the examples above are hypothetical and do not 
necessarily coincide with the numbers you will see in the experiment.  
 
2.  Control questions.  
Please use the Excel worksheet called “Instructions treatment 1” to answer the following 
questions.  The purpose is to make you familiar with it.  
 
a)  Assume you decided to reduce 8 units.  Write number 8 in the yellow cell that corresponds 
to “reduced emissions”.  Out of the 7 units that correspond to your real emissions you decide 
to report 5 units.  Please write number 5 in the yellow cell that corresponds to “reported 
emissions”.  Please look at the table called “earnings” in the same worksheet and answer:    
 
i. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm buys and installs the new 
technology and is visited by the authority? _____ 
ii. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm buys and installs the new 
technology and is not visited by the authority? _____ 
iii. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm uses the actual technology and is 
visited by the authority?_____ 
iv. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm uses the actual technology and is 
not visited by the authority? _____ 
 
b)  Now we will assume something different. Change the numbers you have in the yellow cells 
according to the following. Assume you reduced 5 units of pollution.  Out  of the 10 units that 
correspond to your real emissions you decide to report 10 units   
 
 
v. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm buys and installs the new 
technology and is visited by the authority? _____ 
vi. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm buys and installs the new 
technology and is not visited by the authority? _____ 
vii. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm uses the actual technology and 
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is visited by the authority?_____ 
viii. How much do you earn in tokens if your firm uses the actual technology 
and is not visited by the authority? _____ 
 
3. The experimental card 
To report your decisions you will receive an experimental card, like the one shown below, 
where you will write your decisions.   
 
Experimental card 
Firm number  
Will you buy and install the new technology?  
Reduced emissions  
Reported emissions  
 
4. How does the experiment work? 
 
a. You will receive the Excel worksheet that you will use during the experiment and that 
has the information you need to make decisions. 
b. Using the Excel worksheet you will have 10 minutes to analyze your decisions. 
c. Once you have made your decisions you write them in the experimental card. 
d. Once everyone has turned in the experimental cards, the monitor will randomly draw 
the firms that will be visited by the authority from a bag that has all the firms´ 
numbers.  
e. For those firms that were randomly selected, the authority will verify that the actual 
emissions coincide with the reported emissions. If the authority finds that the firm is 
trying to evade taxes the authority imposes a fine.  
f. Finally we calculate the earnings of all participants according to your decisions.  
 
 
ALL YOUR DECISIONS WILL BE ANONYMOUS AND WILL NOT BE 
DISCLOSED DURING ANY PART OF THE EXPERIMENT. At the end of the 
experiment you will be paid in cash according to your earnings.  
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Appendix B: Predicted levels for actual/reported emissions and violation. 
 
 Predicted actual emissions  
Predicted reported 
emissions  
Predicted violation 
 Adopters Non-adopters Adopters Non-adopters Adopters Non-adopters 
Emission taxes 
Treatment 1 6.9 8.8 1.9 3.8 5.0 5.0 
Treatment 2 6.9 8.8 5.3 7.2 1.6 1.6 
Auctioned TEPs 
Treatment 3 8.9 9.6 8.0 8.7 0.9 0.9 
Treatment 4 8.0 9.2 7.6 8.8 0.4 0.4 
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Appendix C: Non-parametric test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
 
Null hypothesis Expected result P-value Experimental evidence 
What is the influence of monitoring effort on emissions under emission taxes? 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 = Adopters’ 
emissions in Treatment 2 
 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 = Adopters’ 
emissions in Treatment 2 
 
0.920 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
Non-Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 = Non-adopters’ 
emissions in Treatment 2 
Non- adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 = Non-adopters’ 
emissions in Treatment 2 
0.660 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of adoption status on emission under emission taxes? 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1= Non- 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 
 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 < Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 1 
 
0.000 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 2= Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 2 
 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 2 <  Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 2 
 
0.000 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of monitoring probability on report under emission taxes? 
Adopters’ report in Treatment 
1 = Adopters’ report with 
Treatment2 
Adopters’ report in 
Treatment 1 < 
Adopters’ report in 
Treatment 2 
0.012 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
Non-Adopters’ report in 
Treatment 1 = Non-adopters’ 
report with Treatment 2 
Non-Adopters’ report in 
Treatment 1 < Non-
adopters’ report in 
Treatment 2 
0.004 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of adoption status on report under emission taxes? 
Adopters’ report in Treatment 
1= Non- adopters’ report in 
Treatment 1 
Adopters’ report in 
Treatment 1< Non- 
adopters’ report in 
Treatment 1 
0.100 
Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
Adopters’ report in Treatment 
2= Non- adopters’ report in 
Treatment 2 
Adopters’ report in 
Treatment 2 < Non- 
adopters’ report in 
Treatment 2 
0.025 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of monitoring effort on violation? 
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Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1= Adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 2 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1 > Adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 2 
0.030 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
Non- Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1 = Non-adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 2 
Non-adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1 > Non-
adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 2 
0.003 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of adoption status on violation? 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1= Non- adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 1 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1= Non- 
adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 1 
0.015 
Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 2= Non- adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 2 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 2= Non- 
adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 2 
0.225 
Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
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Appendix D: Non-parametric test of Hypothesis 3 and 4 
 
Null hypothesis Expected result P-value Experimental evidence 
What is the influence of monitoring effort on emissions under TEPs? 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3 = Adopters’ 
emissions with Treatment 4 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3< Adopters’ 
emissions in Treatment 4 
0,89 Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
 
 
Non-Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3 = Non-adopters’ 
emissions in Treatment 4 
Non- adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3<  Non-
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 4 
0,22 Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
What is the influence of adoption status on emission under TEPs? 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3= Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3< Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 3 
0.000 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 4= Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 4 
Adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 4<  Non- 
adopters’ emissions in 
Treatment 4 
0.0011 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of monitoring probability on permits holding under TEPs? 
Adopters’ holding in 
Treatment 3 = Adopters’ 
holding in Treatment 4 
Adopters’ permit holding 
in Treatment 3<Adopters’ 
holding in Treatment 4 
0.04 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
Non-Adopters’ holding in 
Treatment 3 = Non-adopters’ 
holding in Treatment 4 
Non-adopters’ permit 
holding in Treatment 3 
< Non-adopters’ permit 
holding in Treatment 4 
0.13 Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
What is the influence of adoption status on permits holding under TEPs? 
Adopters’ permit holding in 
Treatment 3= Non- adopters’ 
permit holding in Treatment 3 
Adopters’ permit holding 
in Treatment 3< Non- 
adopters’ permit holding 
in Treatment 3 
0,11 Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
Adopters’ permit holding in 
Treatment 4= Non- adopters’ 
permit holding in Treatment 4 
Adopters’ permit holding 
in Treatment 4< Non- 
adopters’ permit holding 
in Treatment 4 
0,006 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of monitoring effort on violation under TEPs? 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3 = Adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 4 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3>  Adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 4 
0.008 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
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Non-Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3 = Non-adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 4 
Non-adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3> Non-
adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 4 
0.0007 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
What is the influence of adoption status on violation under TEPs? 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3= Non- adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 3 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3= Non- 
adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 3 
0,02 Does not confirm 
theoretical prediction 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 4= Non- adopters’ 
violation in Treatment 4 
Adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 4 = Non- 
adopters’ violation in 
Treatment 4 
0,82 Confirms theoretical 
prediction 
 
